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ERIE IN BALANCE-WILL EQUITY TIP THE SCALE?
A significant consequence of a federal system of government is that its
court system derives its law from both state and national sources.' The
effective resolution of the inevitable conflicts within that system is made
increasingly important by the dramatic increase in interstate travel and com-
mercial activity with the logical effect of increasing federal jurisdiction
based upon diversity of citizenship. It is essential that litigants take note of a
significant change in the federal court's approach to the rules applicable in
diversity actions and modify their own judicial strategy accordingly.
1.
In 1938 the Supreme Court of the United States laid the modem corner-
stone for the resolution of those conflicts inherent in a federal system of
government. In the seminal case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,2 the
Court decided that in cases involving diversity of citizenship, federal courts
must apply the forum state's substantive law rather than a federal "general
law." Failure to mention matters of procedure implied that such questions
would remain within federal control.
Erie's purpose was to avoid the continuance of inequitable administration
of the law between citizens and non-citizens of a state by discouraging the
forum shopping 3 so prevalent under the previously applied doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson.4 Erie proposed to prevent such treatment by insuring uni-
1 H. M. HART & H. WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM Xi
(1953).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie has been referred to by a former member of the Supreme
Court as "one of the most important cases at law in American legal history." Address
by Justice Black, 13 Mo. B.J. 173, 174 (1942). Consequently it has given rise to
voluminous literature concerning numerous aspects of federal law. For a selected
bibliography see C. A. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COUATS 223-53 (2d ed. 1970).
8 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
4 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166 (1842). Under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson federal courts
exercising jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship were not required to apply
the unwritten law, as indicated by the forum state's highest court in matters of
general jurisprudence. Instead the federal courts were "free to exercise an independent
will as to what the common law of the state is-or should be... " Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
Perhaps the most notorious embodiment of this philosophy is illustrated by Black &
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). Brown
and Yellow and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, both Kentucky corporations,
wished to exclude Black and White from transporting passengers to or from the
railroad's Bolling Green Station. As such an exclusionary contract would have been
void under the common law of Kentucky, Brown and Yellow re-incorporated in
Tennessee and there entered into the desired contract. Brown and Yellow then
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formity of outcome. This uniformity was to be accomplished by requiring
the application of state substantive law, regardless of whether a state or
federal court entertained the action.5 However, the troublesome problem
of determining whether a particular question was one of substance or pro-
cedure remained unsolved.
The absence of a clear dichotomy betveen substance and procedure led
to Guaranty Trust Co. v. York6 in which the expressed purpose of the
Supreme Court's ruling was to insure that a federal court sitting in a diversity
case was in effect only another court of the forum state.7 The determining
factor was to be whether the outcome of a particular case depended on the
rule in question. If so, then the rule was deemed to be a matter of substance
and under the Erie doctrine, state law controlled.8
The outcome determinative test of Guaranty Trust came closer to at-
taining Erie's goal of uniformity of outcome between federal and state
courts than any of its subsequent modifications. However, since most rules
of procedure affect outcome to some degree, the application of a formula
of outcome determination usually had the effect of insuring the application
of state rules, thus effectively subjecting the federal courts to state control.9
brought suit, on the basis of diversity of citizcnship, in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky to enjoin competition at the Bolling
Green Station by Black and White. The injunction issued and was affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court.
5 304 U.S. at 71-80.
6 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This was a suit in which the federal court acquired jurisdiction
through diversity of citizenship. A divided court held a state statute of limitations
to be not a procedural but a substantive matter because the application of that
statute would affect the outcome of the case in question. Despite some erosion of
the rigidity of Guaranty Trust and its test of outcome determination, the viewing
of state statutes of limitation as substantive, rather than procedural, remains pervasive
today. See note 32 infra.
For an interesting approach to the requirement that federal courts follow state
statutes of limitation see Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 538 nA8 (4th
Cir. 1970). The court indicates that in the absence of a constitutional requirement,
federal courts would be forced to rely on state statutes of limitation as an institutional
consideration.
7 326 U.S. at 109.
8Id.
9 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337 U.S. 541 (1949) holding that
a federal court, having jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship in a stockholder's
derivative action, must follow a forum state's statute requiring the plaintiff to post
security for reasonable expenses incurred by the defendant in the event the action
be unsuccessful.
In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), it was concluded that a
contract on which a foreign corporation could not sue in a state court by reason
of a forum state's statute, could not be enforced in a federal court. The court ap-
parently failed to consider Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "The
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The critical shortcoming of Guaranty Trust is that it failed to recognize
important federal interests which might conflict with uniformity of outcome.
II.
A decision which marked a significant movement toward a workable cri-
terion for determining the applicability of state or federal rules of procedure
was Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.10 In Byrd a new
element was introduced: the balancing of state and federal interests in the
rule in question. This new factor was to have important ramifications in the
determination of the applicable law. Although the Supreme Court prior to
Byrd had consistently examined the legislative or judicial policy behind
the state rule, it had done so in terms of its compatability with Erie, by
placing primary emphasis on uniformity of outcome. Significantly, Byrd
recognized the existence of federal interests in addition to, and arguably more
critical than, uniformity of outcome.11
A clearer modification of the outcome determinative test came in Hanna v.
Plumer.'2 For the first time since Erie, the Supreme Court was faced with a
capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under
which it was organized." For a discussion of another type of state "door closing"
statute see note 30 infra.
In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), it was
decided that in diversity actions the state statute of limitations was tolled for the
federal courts not by filing as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but
by the state provision in which service of a summons tolls the statute.
See also, Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-a Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3
VAND. L. REv. 711, 717 (1950).
10 356 U.S. 525 (1958). Basing his action on diversity of citizenship, the plaintiff,
an employee of a contractor doing work for the defendant, sought recovery for an
injury allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence. The defendant asserted as an
affirmative defense the fact that under the state workmen's compensation act the
plaintiff was his employee and consequently limited to the remedies provided by that
act. The trial court rejected this defense as a matter of law and the jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff. The circuit court reversed, holding that as a matter of
law the plaintiff was within the scope of the state workmen's compensation act. On
certiorari the Supreme Court remanded for a determination by a jury whether as
a factual matter the plaintiff came within the statute in question, notwithstanding state
requirements that this decision be made by a judge.
11 356 U.S. at 536-39. Indeed, the federal interest in trial by jury, as a result of the
seventh amendment, is so overriding that the value of Byrd as precedent has been
questioned. See Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflicts of Laws Rules,
39 IND. L.J. 228, 236-37 (1964). This observation would also apply to Nuccio v. General
Host Corp., F. Supp. (E.D. La. 1971). See discussion pp. 367-68 infra.
12 380 U.S. 460 (1965). An Ohio citizen, basing his action on diversity of citizen-
ship, brought an action in a district court in Massachusetts against the defendant
executor for personal injuries. In compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d) (1) service of process was made on the defendant executor's wife at his place
[Vol. 6:360
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situation in which a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was clearly in conflict
with a state rule, and the choice of which to apply was obviously determina-
tive of outcome. 13 Recognizing the often elusive line between substance
and procedure, the Court required the application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure if the question is arguably procedural in scope. Reaffirming
its position in Byrd, the Court noted that the outcome test of Guaranty
Trust was "never intended to serve as a talisman." 14 In those cases in which
a federal rule conforms to the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act and
the Constitution, it is to be applied regardless of the effect on outcome.16
Thus Hanna, as well as Byrd, rejected the formula of outcome determination
as being definitive.
The problem with Hanna's test of whether a rule's scope is arguably
precedural is that it suffers from the weakness implicit in all substance-pro-
cedure questions; the fact is that the courts have fluctuated widely and
frequently in the interpretation of just how far the scope of a particular rule
or policy extends. 16 As previously noted, in determining the scope of a rule
the court has consistently examined the history and underlying interests of
the rule in question. It is in this analysis that the courts have appeared, at
times, to have succumbed to the allure of inductive reasoning. Inasmuch
as Hanna recognized by implication that a limited interpretation of the
scope of a particular rule may avoid a conflict otherwise present under a
broader interpretation,17 there seems to remain the inevitable balancing of
interests which the Court should have acknowledged. Nonetheless, Hanr
was a significant step toward assuring the procedural integrity and inde-
pendence of the federal court system and modulating state control over
federal procedure. Like Byrd, it recognized these interests to be paramount
of residence. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant; holding
the Massachusetts' statute requiring hand delivery to be controlling. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding the question to be one of substance rather than procedure,
af[irmed. "Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed
by the decision below," the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 380 U.S. at 463.
For a discussion of Hanna see McCoid, Hanna v. Plummer The Erie Doctrine Changes-
Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965) and 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 413 (1966).
13 380 US. at 472.
14 Id. at 466-67.
15 Id. at 471. The Court went further, indicating that even if there were no federal
rule requiring in-hand service it is doubtful that the federal court would have been
compelled to follow the Massachusetts statute. Id. at 466.
16 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530, 533 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 US. 99, 109 (1945). See also.
13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 413 (1966).
17 380 U.S. at 470.
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to the federal interest in uniformity of outcome and the state's interests in
applying in its own rule of civil procedure.
III.
In Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co.' s the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on the increased flexibility provided by Byrd and Hanna,
held that the fact that a suit was pending within the federal court system
tolled the running of the applicable state statute of limitations with respect
to that identical suit in other federal courts. 19
In Atkins the plaintiff initially brought an action in the United States
District Court of Western Kentucky 20 for personal injuries sustained in the
state of Virginia. The action was filed within the two year Virginia statute
of limitations21 but after the expiration of the shorter Kentucky period.22
During pretrial proceedings, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed its
previous position by which the filing would have been timely, 23 and the
district court, considering itself bound by Erie, dismissed the action as time-
barred. Before the sixth circuit's ruling2 4 affirming the dismissal became
final, the plaintiff brought his action in a federal court in Virginia25 where
it was eventually considered by the fourth circuit.26
18 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
19 Id. at 527.
20 Allegedly due to the negligent design and construction of a machine manufactured
and sold by the defendant, the plaintiff suffered injuries which required the amputation
of both feet. As Virginia had no long arm statute at that time, the plaintiff brought
his action in Kentucky where the defendant maintained his only place of business.
Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406, 407 (W.D. Va. 1967).
21 VA. CODE Am. § 8-628.1 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
22 Ky. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140 (1969).
2 3 Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1965). The
court required the application of the Kentucky statute of limitations within state
courts if the period of limitation was longer in the state in which the action arose.
This was a direct reversal of the rule existing in Kentucky at the time the action
was originally filed. See Collins v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 299 F.2d 362 (6th
Cir. 1962); Koeppe v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1957);
Burton v. Miller, 185 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1950).
24 Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967).
25268 F.Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967). The district court considered the Virginia two
year statute of limitations to be untolled by the pendency of the Kentucky action
and held the action to be time-barred.
26When the case first came before the court of appeals a divided court upheld
the summary dismissal. The majority considered the Virginia statute of limitations
to be controlling and untolled by the pendency of the Kentucky action. These opinions
were not published and were subsequently withdrawn. On reconsideration the court
en banc concluded that equitable considerations partially precluded the bar of the
statute and granted a subsequent petition for further consideration. 435 F.2d at 527.
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In reaching the conclusion that the statute of limitations had been tolled,
Chief Judge Haynsworth relied primarily on the unitary nature of the fed-
eral court system.27 The system was viewed as one placing great emphasis
on the functioning of the whole, with the United States District Courts
"encompassing almost the whole of federal jurisdiction." 28 The opinion
was supported by drawing an analogy between the tolling effect of trans-
fers between federal courts under federal procedural rules, which is a
federal question, and the present case, involving in effect a transfer between
federal courts, albeit by different procedural means.29
In arriving at its decision, the court applied a method of analysis from a
previous fourth circuit opinion30 designed to determine which rule to apply
in a diversity case:
1. If the state provision, whether legislatively adopted or judicially
declared, is the substantive right or obligation at issue, it is constitu-
tionally controlling.
27 Id. at 528.
28 Id. at 533.
29d. at 528, 537. The court relied on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a); 1406(a) (1970). 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.
The court also drew support from dictum in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S.
463 (1962) which, holding a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to toll the respective
state statues, provided:
When a lawsut is filed, that filing shows a desire on the part of the plaintiff to
begin his case and thereby toll whatever statutes of limitation would otherwise
apply. The filing itself shows the proper diligence on the part of the plaintiff
which such statutes of limitations were intended to insure.
See also Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (dealing with a
federal statute of limitations); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Taylor v.
Love, 415 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023 (1970); Mayo Clinic v.
Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967).
30 Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). In companion
wrongful death actions resulting from a Tennessee airplane crash the plaintiffs, all
Illinois citizens, brought suit against the manufacturer, Beech Aircraft Corporation,
and the Dixie Aviation Company, who had serviced the plane during a stopover
in South Carolina, under the Tennessee wrongful death statute. Beech Aircraft was
incorporated in Delaware with its principle place of business in Kansas. Dixie
Aviation was a South Carolina corporation. Beech Aircraft, contending that the Erie
doctrine applied, moved to dismiss on the basis of a South Carolina "door closing"
statute, precluding the consideration by South Carolina courts of suits brought by
1972]
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2. If the state provision is a procedure intimately bound up with
the state right or obligation, it is likewise constitutionally controlling.
3. If the state procedural provision is not intimately bound up with
the right being enforced but its application would substantially affect
the outcome of the litigation, the federal diversity court must still
apply it unless there are affirmative countervailing considerations .... 31
In determining whether Virginia's tolling rule32 was "intimately bound
non-citizens against foreign corporations for foreign causes of action. The statute,
S.C. CODE ANNt. § 10-214 (1962), provided in relevant part:
An action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other
state... may be brought in the circuit court: (1) By any resident of this State
for any cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this State when
the cause of action shall have arisen or the subject of the action shall be situated
within this State.
The district court denied the motion and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. On consideration the court found the state provision not
to be a substantive right or a procedure intimately bound up with a state substantive
right or obligation. Weighing several federal considerations against the state's interest
in the rule the court concluded the federal considerations to be paramount and
refused to be bound by the statute. See a discussion of Szantay and its effect on
state "door closing" statutes in 66 COLuM. L. REv. 377 (1966).
21435 F.2d at 536. The final consideration is not constitutionally controlling, but
is a matter of comity. As clearly expressed in Szantay this analytical trilogy does not
compledey resolve the issue. "It is necessary to go on and inquire whether the ..•
rule embodies important policies that would be frustrated by the application of a
different federal jurisdictional rule and, if so, is this policy to be overridden because
of a stronger federal policy?" Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th
Cir. 1965).
32 In determining what constituted Virginia's tolling rule, the Atkins court stated
that it could not conclude with any certainty just what holding the Virgina Supreme
Court would make with respect to the instant case.
The court first examined Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 170 Va. 88, 195 S.E. 525
(1938). In that case the plaintiff filed an action against the defendants for malicious
abuse of civil process which was dismissed for lack of venue. Subsequently, in
another trial of the same cause of action against the same defendants, the trial
court refused to allow the fourteen month pendency of the former suit to be
excluded from the statutory period of limitations and held the action to be time-
barred. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.
In Weinstein v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 202 Va. 722, 119 S.E.2d 497 (1961), the plaintiff
filed an action at law to recover on an insurance policy issued by the defendant
company. While the action at law was pending, the plaintiff learned that in order
to recover it would be necessary to reform the contract. Before the action at law
had been dismissed but after the statutory period of limitations the plaintiff brought
a suit in equity in the same court. The Virginia Supreme Court, without referring
to Jones or tolling, held the equity suit to be but a continuation of the earlier law
action. Id. at 729-30, 119 S.E.2d at 503.
In Atkins Judge Winter, specially concurring, considered Weinstein to be dispositive
of the appeal as the suit was instituted in Kentucky before the running of the
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up with the right being enforced," the court concluded that it was not,
the rule being instead an institutional consideration "unrelated to the basic
rights and obligations of the parties."33 This allowed the "affirmative
countervailing considerations" of a unitary and effective federal court sys-
tem with the securing of expeditious disposition of cases on their merits to
prevail.34
In addition to the above federal interests, it is clear that the court was
strongly influenced by the equities of the immediate situation. A good
faith litigant was, by procedural means, being denied an adjudication on the
merits of his case.35 Indeed, it would appear that the needs of the federal
court system, as outlined in the majority opinion, were not alone sufflcientiy
compelling to require redress since two circuit courts had rejected the-
initial request of the petitioner and the fourth circuit was prompted to
reconsider due only to "equitable considerations." 36
It would appear then, that, along with the federal interest in the uniform
administration of the federal court system, equitable considerations may
constitute a legitimate area of federal concern in diversity actions. As
demonstrated in Atkins, the inclusion of equities could well tip the scale
when balancing federal and state interests. The consequent potential impact
within the federal system must not be ignored.
The present trend toward the balancing of federal and state interests finds
perhaps its clearest expression in Nuccio v. General Host Corp.37 In Nuccio
the plaintiff, an injured employee of General Host, sought recovery under
workmen's compensation statutes in a diversity action in the United States
District Court of Eastern Louisiana. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
prohibited a jury trial in such cases. The issue resolved by the court was.
whether to follow the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure calling for a jury
Virginia statute of limitations and then instituted in Virginia before judgment in
the Kentucky courts became final. Thus the Virginia suit was "but a continuation"
of the Kentucky action and timely under Virginia law. 435 F.2d at 538-39.
While Judge Winter concurred in the holding, he disagreed with the reasoning
of the majority opinion and its implications with respect to federal law. Judge Winter
had understandable difficulty seeing how, if a state statute of limitations is concedely,
a matter of substantive law, the tolling of that statute is not "so clearly the obverse
of the same coin" as to render it substantive, and thus constitutionally controlling, as'
well. 435 F.2d at 539.
33 435 F.2d at 537.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 530.
36 The history of the Atkins litigation may be traced through reference to Atkins v.
Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co, 401
F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1957).
37 F. Supp. (ED. La. 1971).
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trial3s or the prohibition by state law. Weighing the policy considerations
of strong federal support of jury trials in civil cases against Louisiana's in-
terest in outcome preference and judicial economy, the court concluded
that the state's interests were not of sufficient magnitude to justify denying
the plaintiff a jury trial.39
With respect to outcome preference40 the district court pointed out that
in Byrd it was noted that the federal judge's power to comment on the
evidence or grant a new trial minimized the possibility of a difference in
outcome when tried by a judge rather than a jury.41
What would be the state's strongest interest-that of preventing costly
and time-consuming trials in certain types of cases-would be unaffected by
allowing a jury trial in a federal court where there would be an expenditure
of federal rather than state resources. The strong federal interest obviously
must prevail over the weaker state's interests when there was a finding that
the latter would not be served in any event.42
While a simple reference to previous decisions43 would have adequately
disposed of the case with respect to the judge-jury relationship, the reason-
ing employed by the court plainly reflected the accelerating trend toward
a predominance of federal policy and rules of procedure resulting from the
propensity of federal courts to balance the relevant interests in diversity
actions. Nuccio unambiguously balanced the state against the federal in-
terests.
IV.
The balancing test as applied in Nuccio and Atkins appears to be a proper
step toward a more realistic test to guide federal courts in the disposition
s8 FED. R. Civ. 38(a).
39 F. Supp. at
40 Outcome preference refers to a belief by the legislature that the result of a trial
will vary depending on whether it is tried by a judge or a jury and their preference
for the judge's decision. F. Supp. at
41 356 U.S. at 540.
42 F. Supp. . It would seem that if the court has correctly identified the
state's interests in prohibiting jury trials in certain types of cases the arguments
against them would apply in every case, as the interests involved would remain con-
stant, and thus require the application of federal rules with respect to jury trials.
For a similar observation concerning certain types of "door closing" statutes see
66 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 385 (1966).
43 In Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), the Supreme Court stated:
We agree ... that the right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be de-
termined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well as other actions. The
Federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength. Id. at
222.
See also Beacon Theaters Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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of diversity cases: 1) by providing the flexibility needed in the consideration
of numerous and often conflicting interests; 2) by taking into account the
inevitable balancing of state and federal interests implicit in federalism;
and 3) by providing a reasonable degree of uniformity and thus predicta-
bility required of any body of law.
The desirability that future litigants take proper notice of the propensity
of the courts to balance various state and federal interests is apparent. Al-
though the federal courts have inevitably explored the interests and policies
behind conflicting rules, judges have consistently been forced to rely on
their own experience and supposition, in determining that those interests
may be.44
Thus in the increasingly flexible area of diversity jurisdiction it would
appear to be of no little importance that the parties be properly prepared
to protect their interests by providing the court with the information needed
for an intelligent consideration of the state and federal interests in a rule
on which the outcome of the case may depend.
1. Q. K., Jr.
44The frequency of this occurence may be indicated by the court's specific reference
in the last three cases considered in this Comment. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co, 435 F.2d
527 (4th Cir. 1970), ". . . [Ilt would be helpful to know with certainty the state
policies underlying the tolling rule." Id. at 536. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), "We are inhibited in our search for the state policy
underlying the South Carolina "door closing" statute by the unavailability of any
legislative history." Id. at 64. Nuccio v. General Host Corp., F. Supp. I
"Although there is no authoritative legislative history or judicial exposition of
Louisiana's limitation on the right to a jury trial, it must be concluded that this
procedural article is supported by interests of outcome preference and judicial
economy." Id. at
1972]
